The New State Sovereignty Movement by Raynor, Austin L.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 90 | Issue 2 Article 4
Spring 2015
The New State Sovereignty Movement
Austin L. Raynor
austinraynor@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Legislation Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Raynor, Austin L. (2015) "The New State Sovereignty Movement," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 90: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol90/iss2/4
The New State Sovereignty Movement 
AUSTIN RAYNOR* 
In the past decade, states across the country have enacted a flood of legislation 
to resist perceived federal encroachments on their sovereignty. These opposition 
statutes assume a variety of forms: some, for instance, merely prohibit state officers 
from assisting in the enforcement of federal law, while others purport to nullify 
particular federal regulations. In the fields of controlled substances, immigration, 
and healthcare, among others, state acts of protest have stimulated the national 
debate and influenced legal obligations in important ways. 
This Article provides the first comprehensive overview of this nascent state 
sovereignty movement. It categorizes opposition enactments according to the legal and 
political purposes they are designed to advance, analyzes the likelihood of preemption, 
and explores the functions they may serve despite the existence of conflicting federal 
law. It then proceeds to identify the structural features these laws share as a class, before 
concluding with an assessment of their normative implications. 
The increasing polarization of national politics will only amplify the importance of 
state resistance efforts. The paucity of scholarship addressing this issue therefore 
represents a major gap in academic efforts to grasp the changing dynamics of inter-
sovereign conflict in the United States. This Article begins to remedy that blind spot. 
The concepts it articulates represent valuable tools not only for exploring state 
legislative resistance to federal policy, but also for addressing the range of issues 
arising from federal discord and geographical polarization more broadly. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) amidst a circus of fanfare and acrimony.1 The ACA inspired deep 
economic, cultural, and constitutional disputes. It also raised important questions of 
federal power and state autonomy. States governed by conservative blocs did not 
accept the statute’s requirements passively. In addition to filing lawsuits, they enacted 
a host of legislative measures ostensibly designed to obstruct implementation of the 
new law.2 Virginia’s bill, for example, declared that “[n]o resident of this 
Commonwealth . . . shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual 
insurance coverage except as required by a court.”3 The precise function of such 
opposition statutes was unclear: some appeared to be merely expressive, others 
jurisdictional, and still others mimicked historical nullification measures.4 Critics 
condemned the laws as divisive relics of an earlier era, while proponents viewed them 
as a last resort to counteract an overreaching federal leviathan.5 
Often overlooked is the fact that the states’ response to the ACA was not an 
isolated event. Instead, it was indicative of a much broader trend that has swept 
statehouses across the country over the course of the past decade.6 Federal policy 
subject to regional unpopularity has increasingly been met with affirmative 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVII, § 2(A)(1) (“A law or rule shall not compel, directly 
or indirectly, any person, employer or health care provider to participate in any health care 
system.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-9003(2) (2011) (“It is hereby declared that the public policy 
of the state of Idaho . . . is that every person within the state of Idaho is and shall be free to 
choose or decline to choose any mode of securing health care services without penalty or threat 
of penalty by the federal government . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-1-2505.5(3)(a) 
(LexisNexis 2011) (“The state shall not require an individual in the state to obtain or maintain 
health insurance . . . .”). 
 3. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2014). 
 4. See infra Part II.A; infra Part III.B; infra Part II.E–F. 
 5. See, e.g., Ben Jacobs, Exclusive: GOP Senate Candidate Caught Saying States Can Nullify 
Federal Laws, DAILY BEAST (July 28, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/28
/exclusive-gop-senate-candidate-caught-saying-states-can-nullify-laws.html (rejecting nullification 
as unconstitutional and linking it to antebellum proponents of slavery); William F. Jasper, Sheriffs 
and Legislators Are Acting To Nullify Obama Gun Controls, NEW AMERICAN (Feb. 4, 2013), 
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/14394-sheriffs-and-legislators-are
-acting-to-nullify-obama-gun-controls (characterizing nullification as a valid tool to resist 
“unconstitutional overreach” by the federal government). 
 6. “An Associated Press analysis found that about four-fifths of the states now have 
enacted local laws that directly reject or ignore federal laws on” various subjects. David A. 
Lieb, Federal Nullification Efforts Mounting in States, THE BIG STORY (June 21, 2013, 4:31 
AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/federal-nullification-efforts-mounting-states. 
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legislative resistance of various stripes. In the fields of controlled substances,7 
immigration,8 and gun rights,9 among others, state acts of protest have stimulated the 
national debate and influenced legal obligations in important ways. As a substantive 
matter, these opposition statutes take a variety of forms: some, for instance, merely 
prohibit state officers from assisting in the enforcement of federal law,10 while others 
purport to nullify particular federal regulations.11 Such resistance efforts originate 
from across the political spectrum and are used to advance a host of diverse policy 
preferences. Notwithstanding the threat of preemption, they are capable of generating 
significant effects in a variety of spheres, from federal enforcement policy to 
constitutional doctrine. 
Although their ramifications are most salient in the political arena, opposition 
statutes also raise a host of delicate legal questions. These issues lie at the intersection 
of several disparate domains of scholarship, including cooperative federalism, 
constitutional construction, and even substantive areas like the Fourth and Second 
Amendments. Although these various fields are useful in illuminating certain facets 
of state opposition, none is capable of capturing the full range of normative and 
conceptual issues such defiance generates. This Article marshals a diverse array of 
scholarship to provide the first comprehensive portrait of state legislative resistance 
to federal policy.12 It situates this nascent movement within the existing literature 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007). 
 8. See, e.g., Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, Ariz. 
Sess. Laws 450 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, and 41 (2010)). 
 9. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-404(a) (2013). 
 10. See infra Part II.C. 
 11. See infra Part II.E. 
 12. Several well-developed fields shed light on the phenomenon of state resistance 
without fully explaining it. The literature on constitutional construction, for instance, 
illuminates certain political ramifications of opposition statutes. See, e.g., KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and 
Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, 
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). Articles assessing departmentalism and judicial review highlight 
the pitfalls and benefits of decentralized constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Larry 
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 1359 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power 
To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). Scholarship examining opportunistic 
federalism illustrates the complex motives underlying state resistance efforts. See, e.g., Frank 
B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304 (1999); John O. McGinnis & 
Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 
99 NW. U. L. REV. 89 (2004). Other federalism literature serves to explore the dynamics of 
intersovereign friction more generally. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, 
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political 
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual 
Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998); cf. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: 
Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987) (cataloguing the benefits of 
competitive federalism). At the micro level, several articles have explored state resistance in 
the context of a single subject matter. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The Vigor of the Anti-
Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1231 (2004); Elizabeth 
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and imposes a measure of analytical structure on what is, at least facially, an 
extraordinarily diverse phenomenon. The discussion that follows is both descriptive 
and normative. It includes a taxonomy of the legal and political purposes these 
enactments are designed to serve, an assessment of their shared structural features, 
and a tentative evaluation of their costs and benefits. 
Part I sketches a brief history of state legislative and executive resistance to national 
policy. Historically, such efforts were classed under the heading of “nullification.” 
Although nullification statutes have, at various intervals since the Founding, prominently 
been enlisted in the service of besmirched causes (such as Massive Resistance),13 their 
full pedigree reveals substantial ideological variance. Furthermore, as this Article will 
illustrate, the term “nullification” embraces only a narrow segment of the broad class of 
modern statutes enacted to obstruct or curtail federal law. 
Part II provides a detailed taxonomy of recent state laws14 intended to thwart 
federal programs, arranged according to their declared purposes. Each of the six 
sections of the taxonomy is accompanied by a brief preemption discussion. The most 
innocuous category includes statutes that serve purely expressive functions; these 
laws express opposition to federal policy but decline to create any legal rights or 
obligations. Tenth Amendment resolutions, for instance, merely reaffirm state 
sovereignty without purporting to have any direct legal effect.15 The second category 
features statutes that explicitly refrain from penalizing, as a matter of state law, 
conduct that is prohibited under federal law. Medical (and recreational) marijuana 
statutes provide a pertinent example.16 The third category encompasses those statutes 
that prohibit state officials from participating in the enforcement of a particular 
federal law (e.g., the Patriot Act), while the fourth category includes state 
                                                                                                                 
 
Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health 
Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111 (2010); David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana 
Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power To Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567 
(2013). Finally, certain authors have begun to conceive of resistance efforts as representative 
of a unified movement, though none has examined it with the depth and scope of this Article. 
See, e.g., THOMAS E. WOODS, JR., NULLIFICATION: HOW TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY IN THE 
21ST CENTURY (2010); John Dinan, Contemporary Assertions of State Sovereignty and the 
Safeguards of American Federalism, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1637 (2010–11); Keely N. Kight, 
Comment, Back to the Future: The Revival of the Theory of Nullification, 65 MERCER L. REV. 
521 (2014). In this vein, a recent Arkansas Law Review symposium explored, from historical 
and theoretical perspectives, the reemergence of the doctrines of secession and nullification in 
twenty-first century America. Symposium, Cooper’s Shadow: Secession, Nullification, and 
States’ Rights, 67 ARK. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 13. Ryan Card, Note, Can States “Just Say No” to Federal Health Care Reform? The 
Constitutional and Political Implications of State Attempts To Nullify Federal Law, 2010 BYU 
L. REV. 1795, 1800. 
 14. The vast majority of state resistance efforts involve statutes, which thus serve as the focus 
of this Article. Nevertheless, alternative forms of opposition—such as executive orders and 
constitutional amendments—are also occasionally employed. See, e.g., Ryan S. Hunter, Note, 
Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing: Nullification and the Question of Gubernatorial Executive 
Power in Idaho, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 659, 705 (2013). For the most part, these alternative modes of 
resistance raise the same legal and political issues as their statutory counterparts. 
 15. See, e.g., S.C.R. 3, 2010 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010). 
 16. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007). 
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supplementation of federal law enforcement efforts. Arizona’s controversial 
immigration laws exemplify this latter category.17 
The more contentious opposition statutes, however, not only establish state 
policies with respect to state officers but actually purport to nullify federal law within 
the territorial boundaries of the complaining state. The fifth category in the taxonomy 
includes statutes that specifically declare federal law void or that outlaw certain 
substantive policies adopted by the federal government. The sixth and final category 
embraces statutes that not only purport to nullify federal law but also provide 
criminal penalties for state or federal agents who attempt to enforce federal law in 
contravention of state policy. 
Part III builds on the analysis in Part II by exploring the primary purposes that 
opposition statutes may advance, apart from those expressed in their text and despite 
any constraints imposed by federal law. Almost all opposition laws serve an 
expressive function by empowering national minorities to effectively voice their 
dissent. The expressive character of these laws may also be effective in directly 
shaping social norms and public opinion. For instance, a statute that removes state 
penalties for conduct prohibited at the national level may reduce the public stigma 
attached to the proscribed activity, despite the fact that the federal prohibition 
remains in force. 
Second, opposition laws are capable of influencing the judicial process in myriad 
ways. For example, a nullification statute that purports to invalidate federal policy 
may serve as a catalyst for private citizens to bring lawsuits challenging federal 
regulatory regimes. At a more substantive level, the constitutional principles 
endorsed by opposition statutes can exert a gravitational effect on the legal reasoning 
utilized by courts engaged in constitutional adjudication. These bills may also 
contribute to the formation of enforceable constitutional understandings outside the 
courts. Both of these latter avenues of influence reflect the role opposition measures 
play in the process of constitutional politics. 
Finally, opposition laws may have an impact on national policy. State decisions 
to refrain from penalizing conduct prohibited at the federal level, for instance, may 
encourage the national government to reallocate its enforcement resources to those 
activities proscribed under both state and federal law. Marijuana policy represents a 
prime example of this effect. Relatedly, statutes that bar state officials from 
implementing a particular federal program may spur changes in national substantive 
policy. The federal government relies heavily on state manpower to realize its policy 
goals and thus may be willing to tweak those goals in order to obtain state assistance. 
Part IV makes several transsubstantive observations pertaining to state opposition 
statutes as a class. Perhaps the most significant unifying characteristic of these laws 
is their tendency to phrase objections to federal policy, or assertions of state 
authority, in constitutional terms.18 This feature not only imparts an aura of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, Ariz. Sess. 
Laws 450 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 
13, 23, 28, 41 (2010)). 
 18. The Idaho Health Freedom Act, for example, states: 
The power to require or regulate a person’s choice in the mode of securing health 
care services, or to impose a penalty related thereto, is not found in the 
Constitution of the United States of America, and is therefore a power reserved 
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legitimacy to a potentially suspect enterprise but also represents a form of 
constitutional politics. Constitutional revolutions often crystallize outside the context 
of formal adjudication. Opposition statutes thus enable states to participate in the 
nonjudicial process of constitutional construction. 
A second permeating characteristic of this body of law is its variable political 
orientation. Resistance measures serve a broad range of purposes originating from 
across the political spectrum. State sovereignty is invoked not only to protect 
traditionally right-wing causes, such as free trade in firearms, but also stereotypically 
left-wing causes, such as access to medical marijuana. Political diversity in what is 
essentially a states’ rights movement bears out, at least in part, a theory of 
opportunistic federalism, which posits that invocations of federalism tend to be 
spurred by specific substantive concerns, rather than by an interest in protecting the 
federal structure per se. 
A third ubiquitous feature of these statutes is their territorialism. Even bills that 
explicitly nullify federal law only purport to extinguish its effect within the physical 
borders of the complaining state.19 Nullification and related tactics—both historically 
and today—are limited, defensive mechanisms designed merely to neutralize federal 
policy as it applies to state residents. 
Part V addresses the normative aspects of the state sovereignty movement and 
tentatively concludes that this phenomenon is desirable insofar as it promotes the 
purposes of federalism within the bounds of law. This verdict is necessarily 
conditional; the primary function of this Part is merely to identify the conceptual 
tools necessary to conduct meaningful analysis in this area. Traditional nullification 
efforts posed serious threats to national unity to the extent that they involved state 
assertions of interpretive supremacy on constitutional issues. The modern recasting 
of these efforts, however, accepts judicial supremacy in actually litigated cases while 
still enabling interpretive pluralism on subject matters that remain in legal flux. 
Certain problems—such as the tendency to produce legal uncertainty—continue to 
plague even this modern incarnation. In general, though, contemporary opposition 
statutes advance important federalism values without fomenting the divisive 
sectionalism that marred earlier nullification attempts. To facilitate the analysis, this 
Part introduces the concept of “vertical departmentalism,” or the exercise of 
independent interpretive authority over the Constitution by state actors. Vertical 
departmentalism serves to supplement its horizontal counterpart by further 
decentralizing the interpretive task. 
The nature and extent of state power are recurring and important leitmotifs in the 
American constitutional project. Nullification, in particular, has historically provided 
a flashpoint for debate over the limits of state autonomy. State legislative opposition 
to federal policy therefore provides an apt vehicle for exploring deep themes of 
federalism and sovereignty. The modern manifestation of this tradition, although it 
                                                                                                                 
 
to the people pursuant to the Ninth Amendment, and to the several states pursuant 
to the Tenth Amendment. 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-9003(1) (2011). 
 19. The Virginia Healthcare Freedom Act, for instance, provides that “[n]o resident of 
this Commonwealth . . . shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance 
coverage.” VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2014) (emphasis added). 
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enjoys a rich lineage, is a distinctive and novel phenomenon that warrants a 
comprehensive treatment of its own. 
If current trends persist, the importance of this movement will only increase with 
time. American politics are marked by escalating polarization, both geographical and 
political.20 This development likely has its roots in certain structural features of 
modern American democracy and is therefore unlikely to recede for the foreseeable 
future.21 Geographical polarization ensures that federal programs and regulations 
frequently garner intense resistance in discrete areas of the country. These conditions 
provide fertile ground for state opposition efforts, which track local disenchantment 
with federal policy. To the extent polarization continues to intensify,22 such efforts 
can be expected to accelerate correspondingly. 
Opposition statutes thus potentially signify a new paradigm for state-level 
politics, one in which state legislatures operate as fundamentally reactive institutions 
that serve to mediate the relationship between the federal government and state 
citizens. As this Article shows, such state-level politics can have an enormous effect 
on national policy. The paucity of scholarship addressing this issue therefore 
represents a major gap in academic efforts to grasp the changing dynamics of state 
and federal relationships. This Article begins to remedy that blind spot, providing a 
research agenda and the conceptual tools necessary to assess not only the burgeoning 
sovereignty movement but also the gamut of issues arising from geographical 
polarization and federal discord more broadly. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NULLIFICATION 
Historically, overt forms of state resistance to federal policy were grouped under 
the heading of “nullification.” Nullification takes place when a state declares that a 
particular federal law is unconstitutional and therefore inoperative.23 Nullification 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. See, e.g., William A. Galston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77 
UMKC L. REV. 307, 312–15 (2008); PEW RES. CENTER, PARTISAN POLARIZATION SURGES IN 
BUSH, OBAMA YEARS (2012). 
 21. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of 
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 332 (2011) (“[O]ur radically 
polarized politics . . . reflect long-term structural and historical changes in American 
democracy that are likely to endure for some time to come.”). 
 22. Steven Strauss, Six Reasons American Political Polarization Will Only Get Worse, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 14, 2012, 4:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-strauss
/megatrend-six-reasons-ame_b_1965182.html. It might do so, for instance, if voters drift 
geographically towards other like-minded voters, thereby sorting themselves into ideological 
enclaves. See Galston, supra note 20, at 312–15. 
 23. H. Newcomb Morse, The Foundations and Meaning of Secession, 15 STETSON L. REV. 
419, 420 (1986). Senator John Calhoun defined nullification as “declaring null an 
unconstitutional act of the General Government, as far as the State is concerned.” Id. (quoting 
W. STEPHENSON, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE OLD SOUTH 167 (1959)). Although the terms 
“nullification” and “interposition” originally had different connotations, their contemporary 
meanings have largely converged. Robert S. Claiborne, Jr., Comment, Why Virginia’s 
Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Did Not Invoke Nullification, 
46 U. RICH. L. REV. 917, 924 & n.49 (2012). 24. See infra notes 43, 47, 65, and 
accompanying text. 
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traditionally has been used as a defensive measure designed primarily to neutralize 
the impact of federal policy within the territorial borders of the nullifying state.24 
Direct nullification, obviously, does not exhaust the wide variety of opposition 
efforts examined in this Article.25 For instance, state statutes that provide for 
enhanced enforcement of federal law plainly do not qualify as nullification measures 
in the traditional sense. 
A concise historical summary can nevertheless be illuminating for several 
reasons. Despite the important dissimilarities between the two classes of laws, many 
commentators have explicitly analogized contemporary antifederal enactments to 
their historical predecessors.26 The following account thus provides relevant context 
for the debate. Furthermore, the normative inquiry contained in Part V attempts to 
demonstrate that modern opposition efforts are less divisive and potentially 
destructive than their forebears. The summary that follows sets the stage for this later 
discussion. It also introduces many of the themes and ideas that continue to 
characterize opposition statutes, including political opportunism and the use of 
constitutional rhetoric. 
The first and most famous treatment of the nullification doctrine occurred with 
the passage of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799.27 The 
Resolutions were drafted by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, respectively, in 
response to the Alien and Sedition Acts, which generally prohibited speech critical 
of the national government.28 The Resolutions were deeply influenced by 
contemporary political strife; Republicans, including Jefferson and Madison, 
believed that the Federalist-sponsored Acts were specifically designed to silence 
Republican dissent.29 The key strategic decision made by the authors was to cast their 
political opposition in constitutional terms, asserting that the Alien and Sedition Acts 
were not only unwise but also unconstitutional. The authority to issue the Resolutions 
purportedly stemmed from a state prerogative to nullify unconstitutional laws.30 
Jefferson’s drafts were noticeably more combative than Madison’s31 and 
constitute the more revealing portrait of the nullification doctrine.32 Relying on a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. See infra notes 43, 47, 65, and accompanying text. 
 25. See Dinan, supra note 12, at 1641. 
 26. See, e.g., Jeff Taylor, States’ Fights, AM. CONSERVATIVE, July 2010, at 32. These 
analogies, obviously, cast modern opposition efforts in a distinctly unflattering light. See, e.g., 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2734 
(2003) (noting that the “terms ‘interposition’ and ‘nullification’ are practically constitutional 
profanities these days”); Sean Wilentz, States of Anarchy, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 29, 2010, at 5 
(arguing that the “current rage for nullification is nothing less than another restatement, in a 
different context, of musty neo-Confederate dogma”). 
 27. See Paulsen, supra note 26, at 2735. 
 28. Card, supra note 13, at 1801. 
 29. Robert B. McKay, “With All Deliberate Speed”: A Study of School Desegregation, 
31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1025 (1956). 
 30. Thomas Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolutions of 1799, reprinted in WOODS, supra 
note 12, at 167, 169 (declaring nullification to be the “rightful remedy” for unconstitutional 
acts by the federal government). The precise scope of this remedy, however, was subject to 
dispute. See infra notes 32, 36. 
 31. Card, supra note 13, at 1803. 
 32. The Virginia Resolution does not explicitly assert the right to nullify federal 
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compact theory of the Constitution—which views that document as a contract 
between individual sovereigns33—the first of the two Kentucky Resolutions 
contended “that whensoever the general government assumes undelegated powers, 
its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force.”34 Independent state interpretive 
authority originated from the simple proposition that “this government, created by 
this compact, was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers 
delegated to itself, since that would have made its discretion, and not the 
Constitution, the measure of its powers.”35 The second resolution, characterized by 
an even more strident tone, proclaimed that “the several states who formed that 
[compact], being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge 
of its infraction; . . . a nullification, by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts 
done under colour of that instrument, is the rightful remedy.”36 
The confrontation engendered by the Alien and Sedition Acts abated when the 
Federalists lost power in the landslide election of 1800, rendering the Resolutions 
moot.37 Ironically, however, nullification was invoked soon thereafter by the 
Federalists in response to the conduct of the Jefferson administration.38 The subject 
of the furor was the Embargo Acts,39 a series of bills enacted with the ostensible 
purpose of imposing economic hardship on England and France.40 The Embargo Acts 
not only severely suppressed maritime commerce but also authorized a host of 
intrusive enforcement mechanisms;41 these features converged to outrage merchants 
and delegates across the Northeast.42 The Massachusetts House of Representatives, 
for instance, issued a report that declared the fourth Embargo Act “in many respects 
unjust, oppressive and unconstitutional, and not legally binding on the citizens of this 
                                                                                                                 
 
legislation, though it does claim that states “have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose, 
for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the 
authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.” James Madison, Virginia Resolution, 
reprinted in WOODS, supra note 12, at 147, 148. 
 33. See Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy: Insights from the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 319 (1994); Stephen C. Neff, 
Secession and Breach of Compact: The Law of Nature Meets the United States Constitution, 
45 AKRON L. REV. 405, 413–15 (2012). 
 34. Thomas Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in WOODS, supra 
note 12, at 157, 157. 
 35. Id. at 157–58. 
 36. Jefferson, supra note 30, at 169 (emphasis omitted). Whether Jefferson believed that 
a single state could engage in nullification, or that nullification required collective action, is a 
matter of continuing debate. See Moore, supra note 33, at 320. 
 37. See Card, supra note 13, at 1804. 
 38. O. Shane Balloun, The Disarming Nature of the Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act: A 
Constitutional Analysis of Wyoming’s Interposition Between Its Citizens and the Federal 
Government, 11 WYO. L. REV. 201, 209 n.60 (2011). 
 39. Act of Apr. 25, 1808, ch. 66, 2 Stat. 499; Act of Mar. 12, 1808, ch. 33, 2 Stat. 473; 
Act of Jan. 8, 1808, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 453; Act of Dec. 22, 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451. 
 40. Bradley D. Hays, A Place for Interposition? What John Taylor of Caroline and the 
Embargo Crisis Have to Offer Regarding Resistance to the Bush Constitution, 67 MD. L. REV. 
200, 210 (2007). 
 41. See id. at 211–12. 
 42. See WOODS, supra note 12, at 61. 
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state.”43 The Connecticut General Assembly passed a special resolution that not only 
declared the Embargo Acts unconstitutional but also explicitly prohibited state officers 
from assisting in their enforcement.44 In the face of widespread popular resistance, 
Jefferson relented and the Republicans repealed the offensive legislation.45 
The Nullification Crisis of 1832 illustrated both the deep theoretical complexity 
and practical importance of nullification. In 1828, Congress passed what became 
popularly known as the “Tariff of Abominations,” which was widely perceived by 
those in the South as detrimental to their own agricultural interests and 
disproportionately favorable to Northern manufacturing concerns.46 South Carolina 
responded by passing an ordinance declaring the tariff “null, void, and no law, nor 
binding upon this State, its officers or citizens.”47 The ordinance also threatened 
secession in the event that any efforts were made to enforce the tariff.48 The federal 
government responded swiftly and ferociously; President Andrew Jackson issued a 
proclamation explicitly declaring nullification unconstitutional,49 and Congress 
enacted the Force Bill to compel compliance.50 The Crisis was only narrowly averted 
when Congress adopted a compromise tariff and South Carolina responded by 
withdrawing its nullification statute.51 
The history of the Nullification Crisis, as well as much of the intellectual baggage 
associated with nullification as an instrument of practical politics, is heavily 
intertwined with the writings and political machinations of then-Vice President John 
Calhoun. Calhoun radically expanded the principles articulated in the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions.52 According to Calhoun, nullification suspended the 
operation of a federal statute until a nationwide convention either rejected or ratified 
the proposed nullification.53 
Like Jefferson, Calhoun rested his views on a compact theory of the Constitution: 
as an equal and sovereign party to the constitutional compact, each state retained the 
authority to suspend its consent to national rule when the federal government 
overstepped its delegated powers.54 A state’s right to judge whether federal action 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Hays, supra note 40, at 213. 
 44. Id. at 214. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Card, supra note 13, at 1804. 
 47. S.C., Ordinance To Nullify Certain Acts of the Congress of the United States, Purporting 
To Be Laws Laying Duties and Imposts on the Importation of Foreign Commodities (Nov. 24, 
1832), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ordnull.asp; see also Morse, supra 
note 23, at 421. Interestingly, Madison argued that South Carolina’s nullification efforts were not 
constitutionally justified. Claiborne, supra note 23, at 936. 
 48. Morse, supra note 23, at 421. 
 49. Card, supra note 13, at 1806. 
 50. Claiborne, supra note 23, at 936. 
 51. McKay, supra note 29, at 1036. 
 52. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 80. 
 53. See John Bryan Williams, How To Survive a Terrorist Attack: The Constitution’s 
Majority Quorum Requirement and the Continuity of Congress, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1025, 1043 n.62 (2006); see also James H. Read, Madison’s Response to Nullification, in 
JAMES MADISON: PHILOSOPHER, FOUNDER, AND STATESMAN 269, 270 (John R. Vile, William 
D. Pederson & Frank J. Williams eds., 2008). 
 54. Nullification, in 2 CYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND OF 
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transgressed the terms of the compact was “an essential attribute of sovereignty”; to 
deny this right amounted to reducing the states “to a subordinate corporate condition.”55 
Vesting a branch of the federal government with ultimate authority to determine the 
scope of federal power would, according to this theory, effectively eradicate any limit 
on that power.56 For Calhoun, nullification was implicit in the structure of American 
government itself and a necessary check on majoritarian excess.57 
Following the Nullification Crisis, the political valence of nullification switched 
yet again, when it was invoked by Northern abolitionists to protect the rights of 
escaped slaves. In 1850, Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act amidst intense 
controversy.58 A host of states immediately enacted measures to impede its 
enforcement.59 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin nullified the Act,60 as did the 
legislatures of Massachusetts and Vermont.61 The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions 
were referenced repeatedly by abolitionists agitating for interposition.62 Antislavery 
states also sought to hamper the law’s effectiveness by prohibiting state officers from 
assisting in its enforcement and denying federal officials the use of local jails.63 
The most recent invocation of the doctrine occurred during the Massive 
Resistance campaign undertaken by Southern states in response to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.64 Protesting states characterized 
Brown as an unlawful judicial amendment to the Constitution and retaliated with a 
wave of nullification statutes designed to neutralize its impact. Mississippi’s 
response, which was typical, labeled Brown “unconstitutional, invalid and of no 
lawful effect within . . . Mississippi.”65 Supporters of Massive Resistance frequently 
cited the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, as well as the theoretical arguments 
articulated by Calhoun.66 The Supreme Court definitively rejected nullification 
during this period, establishing judicial hegemony as a broad matter in Cooper v. 
Aaron67 and dismissing nullification specifically in United States v. Louisiana.68 
According to the Louisiana Court, “The conclusion is clear that interposition is not 
                                                                                                                 
 
THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1050, 1051 (John J. Lalor ed., 1883). 
 55. JOHN C. CALHOUN, Exposition and Protest, in UNION AND LIBERTY 311, 348 (Ross M. 
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 56. Id. 
 57. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 81. 
 58. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462; see also Morse, supra note 23, at 422. 
 59. See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE 
NORTH, 1780-1861, at 166–85 (1974) (describing Northern responses to the Fugitive Slave Act). 
 60. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854). 
 61. Morse, supra note 23, at 422–23. 
 62. WOODS, supra note 12, at 81–83. 
 63. Taylor, supra note 26. These forms of sub-nullification resistance are echoed in many 
of today’s opposition efforts. See infra Part II.C. 
 64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 65. Card, supra note 13, at 1807 (quoting William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court 
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 67. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 68. 364 U.S. 500 (1960). 
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a constitutional doctrine. If taken seriously, it is illegal defiance of constitutional 
authority.”69 
II. TAXONOMY OF STATE OPPOSITION LAWS 
Contemporary state efforts to resist or derail federal policy take a variety of forms. 
This Part categorizes state opposition laws according to the specific purposes they 
are facially designed to serve.70 Each subpart summarizes a particular category of 
legislation, provides concrete examples of statutes exemplifying the class, and 
concludes with a brief preemption analysis. 
A. Statutes that Express an Opinion on Federal Policy 
Opposition statutes often do no more than simply express the state’s position on 
a particular issue. In some cases, these laws merely reassert, as a general matter, the 
state’s exclusive jurisdiction over those subject matters not explicitly delegated to 
the federal government by the Constitution. In other instances, they serve as vehicles 
for a state (or state subdivision, such as a locality) to express its views on a particular 
federal policy. Regardless of the tenor or specificity of the enactment, however, the 
statutes in this category are uniformly intended to be merely expressive in nature. 
They neither create rights or obligations in state citizens nor affect the operation of 
any regulatory apparatus.71 
Many expressive statutes simply reaffirm the policy of state autonomy embodied 
in the Tenth Amendment.72 Utah’s Tenth Amendment Resolution, which exemplifies 
this type of enactment, provides in part: 
[T]he Legislature of the state of Utah, the Governor concurring therein, 
acknowledge and reaffirm residuary and inviolable sovereignty of the 
state of Utah under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States over all powers not otherwise enumerated and granted to 
the federal government by the Constitution of the United States.73 
The Utah bill concludes by “strongly” urging the repeal of certain national legislation 
and calling for its own transmission to both the federal government and sister states.74 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. Id. at 501 (quoting Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916, 926 (E.D. 
La. 1960)). 
 70. The Tenth Amendment Center provides legislative tracking on opposition efforts 
nationwide. The 10th Amendment Nullification Movement, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER, 
http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/the-10th-amendment-movement/comment-page-9/. 
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 72. The text of the Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST amend. X. 
 73. S.C.R. 3, 2010 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010). 
 74. Id. 
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Other expressive resolutions target a particular national policy for criticism. 
Following the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, for 
instance, the Board of Commissioners of Fremont County, Colorado, issued a 
resolution condemning several of the bill’s provisions.75 In similar fashion, following 
passage of the Patriot Act, the City of Austin, Texas, issued a resolution criticizing 
elements of the bill and reaffirming its commitment “to the protection of civil rights 
and civil liberties for all of its residents . . . .”76 The resolution further stated that 
certain provisions of the Act “threaten fundamental rights and liberties” and 
requested Texas representatives to actively seek their repeal.77 
Expressive pronouncements of this nature are not subject to federal preemption. 
They do not interfere with the operation of any federal law;78 indeed, they do not 
purport to have any legal effect whatsoever. They represent nothing more than 
formalized expressions of protest against allegedly unconstitutional national policies. 
This type of purely expressive enactment may even be affirmatively protected from 
preemption by the First Amendment.79 
B. Statutes that Exempt Federally Prohibited Conduct from State Law Penalties 
States often choose to permit, as a matter of state law, conduct prohibited at the 
federal level. This choice can take one of two forms. First, the state may simply 
decline to penalize certain conduct under state law, regardless of its status under 
federal law. This situation, which is often evidenced by statutory silence, occurs with 
remarkable frequency. Since federal and state criminal laws are not congruent, there 
exists a wide swath of behavior subject to federal but not state prosecution. In this 
respect, a state’s mere failure to prohibit particular activities criminalized at the 
federal level does not necessarily bespeak disapproval of national policy. 
In some instances, however, a state’s decision to refrain from criminalizing 
conduct may represent a form of resistance to federal law. Such opposition is 
signified when the state ostentatiously decriminalizes a federally prohibited 
activity,80 or goes even further and affirmatively legitimizes that activity by 
providing various regulatory and legal protections to those who engage in it. In these 
cases, although the federal prohibition remains in effect, the more permissive state 
regime exists as a background rule that operates to the extent the federal government 
fails to enforce its own laws. This regulatory approach, which conspicuously 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. Carie Canterbury, County Passes Due Process Resolution, CANON CITY DAILY REC. 
(Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.canoncitydailyrecord.com/ci_19814522. 
 76. CITY OF AUSTIN, TEX., RES. NO. 030807-37 (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org
/national-security/austin-tx-resolution. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See infra notes 125–126 and accompanying text. 
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signifies the state’s preferred alternative to national prohibition, constitutes a form 
of passive dissent to federal policy.81 
Medical marijuana laws82 are arguably the most widespread, politically salient, 
and practically significant example of this genus of statutes. Under the federal 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the cultivation, possession, and distribution of 
marijuana are prohibited.83 In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court, faced with a 
more permissive state law regime, categorically upheld the application of the CSA 
to medical marijuana.84 Nevertheless, several states have persisted in declining to 
criminalize—as a matter of state law—medical marijuana and have instead 
promulgated detailed regulations to govern its use.85 These states typically provide a 
list of qualifying conditions, require the patient to obtain a doctor’s recommendation, 
and regulate the amount of marijuana that may be possessed as well as the places in 
which it may be consumed.86 Some states even grant patients the right to recover any 
marijuana that has been wrongfully seized by state law enforcement officers,87 while 
others provide special legal protections to registered users of the drug. Oregon, for 
instance, prohibits landlords from terminating a tenant’s lease on the basis of the 
tenant’s use of medical marijuana in accordance with state law.88 
The preemption analysis for this class of statutes is heavily informed by the 
anticommandeering rule established by the Supreme Court in New York v. United 
States.89 According to the New York Court, “[E]ven where Congress has the authority 
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the 
power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”90 Consequently, 
the federal government may not oblige a state to criminalize—or preclude it from 
decriminalizing—marijuana use.91 Regulatory provisions attendant upon state 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. See Balloun, supra note 38, at 232 (describing state medical marijuana laws as a form 
of “passive” state interposition). 
 82. Recreational marijuana laws obviously raise similar issues. This Article focuses on 
medical marijuana statutes for the simple reason that they are more common and thus provide 
a greater number of data points. 
 83. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 
84 Stat. 1236, 1247, 1249, 1260. This prohibition is subject to certain minor exceptions not 
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 84. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 85. The list of states with medical marijuana statutes continues to evolve. Between 1996 
and 2011, sixteen states legalized the use of marijuana for medical purposes. Dinan, supra 
note 12, at 1647. 
 86. Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ 
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 87. Id. at 1430. 
 88. OR. REV. STAT. § 90.396(1)(f)(B)(i) (2013). 
 89. 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). For a comprehensive analysis of the intersection of 
preemption doctrine and the anticommandeering rule in this context, see generally Schwartz, 
supra note 12. 
 90. New York, 505 U.S. at 166. 
 91. See Mikos, supra note 86, at 1423–24; see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 646 
(9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“[P]reventing the state from repealing an existing 
law is no different from forcing it to pass a new one; in either case, the state is being forced to 
regulate conduct that it prefers to leave unregulated.”). 
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decriminalization, such as the requirement of doctor recommendations, are similarly 
exempt from preemption insofar as they function merely to separate legal from illegal 
conduct under state law.92 Mechanisms of this variety simply define the contours of 
the state regime that operates as the background rule to federal prohibition. 
State laws that provide affirmative protections to marijuana users, however, are 
more susceptible to invalidation.93 The CSA expressly disclaims field preemption 
but does mandate that a state statute be preempted if “there is a positive conflict 
between [the state and federal laws] so that the two cannot consistently stand 
together.”94 Thus, a state law that insulates a marijuana user from eviction may be 
preempted to the extent the statute aids and abets a violation of the CSA.95 Similarly, 
a requirement that a state officer return wrongfully seized marijuana to its original 
owner may be preempted because it requires law enforcement to “distribute” a 
controlled substance.96 None of these observations, however, trenches on the 
fundamental principle that a state may legalize, as a matter of state law, conduct 
otherwise prohibited at the federal level. 
C. Statutes that Bar State Officials from Implementing Federal Law 
Statutes that bar state officials from implementing federal law are conceptually 
analogous to the statutes described in the previous subpart: both simply decline to 
employ the state enforcement apparatus against particular activities. By explicitly 
prohibiting its officers from assisting in the enforcement of a specific federal law, a 
state unmistakably codifies its objection to national policy. These statutes possess a 
substantial historical pedigree; many Northern states, for instance, barred their 
officers from assisting in the implementation of the Fugitive Slave Act.97 
A paradigmatic example of this class of laws is the Wyoming Firearms Freedom 
Act.98 The Act provides that any firearm manufactured in Wyoming that remains 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 646 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“By precluding doctors, on pain 
of losing their DEA registration, from making a recommendation that would legalize the patients’ 
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(7th Cir. 1991) (exploring the contours of aiding and abetting liability in the context of the 
War on Drugs). 
 96. Mikos, supra note 86, at 1459. 
 97. See supra note 63 and accompanying text; see also supra note 44 and accompanying 
text (similar state legislation enacted in opposition to the Embargo Acts). 
 98. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-404 to 6-8-406 (2013). Another example is a recent wave of 
proposed bills that would bar state officials from implementing the ACA. See Jacob Gershman, 
Bills Proposed in Several States Would Nullify Affordable Care Act, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 
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within the physical borders of the state is not subject to federal gun regulations.99 
Wyoming’s asserted authority over domestic firearms is predicated on a narrow 
reading of the Commerce Clause: the Act explicitly declares that locally 
manufactured guns that remain exclusively within the state have not moved in 
“interstate commerce.”100 As relevant here, the Act prohibits state officers from 
violating its provisions by assisting in the enforcement of contrary federal law.101 
Statutes of this variety occasionally qualify their scope with constitutional 
language, prohibiting state participation in federal enforcement efforts only where 
those efforts, in the judgment of the state, would be unconstitutional. Virginia’s 
response to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)—which arguably 
authorizes the indefinite detention of American citizens102—exemplifies this 
particular variant. Virginia’s statute provides that no state officer 
shall knowingly aid . . . in the detention of any citizen pursuant to 50 
U.S.C. § 1541 as provided by the [NDAA] . . . if such aid would 
knowingly place [the officer] in violation of the United States 
Constitution, the Constitution of Virginia, any provision of the Code of 
Virginia, any act of the General Assembly, or any regulation of the 
Virginia Administrative Code.103 
The inclusion of the federal Constitution as an independent basis for refusing to assist 
in the detention of citizens implies that, at least in some circumstances, the state’s 
judgment of whether an enforcement effort complies with the Constitution will 
diverge from the judgment made by the federal government.104 In other words, the 
statute implicitly deems certain actions sanctioned by the NDAA unconstitutional.105 
Like the statutes examined in the previous subpart, these laws are protected from 
preemption by the anticommandeering rule recognized in New York.106 In Printz v. 
United States, the Court elaborated on the New York doctrine in the enforcement 
context, declaring that “the Federal Government may not compel the States to 
implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.”107 
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Although state officers may not interfere with a federal agent’s performance of his 
official duties, Congress cannot require state officers to affirmatively assist in the 
execution of federal law.108 Importantly, the Printz rule is categorical: the Court made 
clear that in this context “a ‘balancing’ analysis is inappropriate.”109 “It is the very 
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no comparative 
assessment of the various interests can overcome that fundamental defect.”110 
The federal government’s inability to commandeer the states, however, does not 
necessarily indicate that a state may decline to provide assistance for any reason it 
chooses. Racially or religiously motivated refusals to aid federal law enforcement may 
be subject to constitutional constraints, for instance.111 Most modern prohibitions on 
assistance, however, do not implicate the Constitution’s equality guarantees. These 
statutes are instead typically predicated on expansive readings of constitutional rights 
or narrow constructions of federal power.112 The former almost certainly constitute a 
permissible basis for withholding state assistance; it is widely accepted that federal 
rights constitute a floor rather than a ceiling with respect to state conduct.113 
The latter also likely fall within the purview of the Printz doctrine—even if the 
Supreme Court fails to endorse (or even rejects) the constitutional position adopted 
by the state. Unlike a racially or religiously motivated law, a statute of this variety 
does not contravene any constitutional prohibition. In the absence of constitutional 
infirmity, the categorical nature of the Printz rule suggests that a state’s motivation 
for declining to participate in a federal program is irrelevant. Consequently, states 
are probably justified in withholding assistance on the basis of constitutional 
objections that would not succeed in federal court.114 The anticommandeering rule 
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 114. See Althouse, supra note 12, at 1256. 
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thus effectively permits a degree of autonomy on the part of state officials in 
interpreting the federal constitution.115 
D. Statutes that Provide for Enhanced Enforcement of Federal Law 
Many state statutes incorporate federal substantive standards but establish 
enforcement mechanisms more strenuous than those approved by the President or 
Congress. These enactments often include provisions that expand the discretion of state 
officers to enforce federal law or attach additional state penalties to federal violations. 
Consequently, these statutes reflect a degree of dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of 
federal enforcement policy rather than with federal substantive policy per se. 
Statutes of this variety are prevalent in the immigration context. Arizona’s 
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act116 represents the most 
salient recent example. Arizona’s bill, which relied on federal law for its definition 
of alienage, was intended to augment federal efforts to curtail illegal immigration.117 
Section 3 of the Act rendered it a state misdemeanor to fail to comply with federal 
registration requirements.118 Section 5(C) prohibited undocumented aliens from 
working or seeking employment in the state.119 Section 6 authorized state officers to 
make warrantless arrests of individuals the officer had probable cause to believe had 
committed an offense that rendered them removable.120 Finally, Section 2(B) required 
an officer who lawfully detained an individual to make a reasonable attempt to 
determine the person’s immigration status if the officer had reasonable suspicion that 
the person was an undocumented alien.121 
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court evaluated the validity of these 
provisions and determined that federal law preempted Sections 3, 5(C), and 6, but 
that 2(B) survived.122 The instructiveness of the ruling is limited, however, by its 
heavy reliance on the national government’s “exclusive authority over foreign 
affairs.”123 As a result, the opinion’s reasoning is probably of minimal relevance 
outside the immigration context.124 
The preemption of state efforts to augment federal enforcement in other circumstances 
will depend on one of two legal standards. Although certain state schemes may be field 
preempted, this category of preemption analysis is rarely invoked by the modern Court.125 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. See id. at 1259–60. 
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 123. The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 327, 330 (2012). 
 124. An increasing number of states have adopted statutes modeled after or related to 
Arizona’s approach. See Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption, and the Lost 
Legacy of McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 157 n.14 (2012). 
 125. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227 (2000) (“The Court has 
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Preemption will instead typically turn on whether, in the canonical language of conflict 
preemption, state action “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”126 
Under this standard, the Court has repeatedly invalidated state penalties attached 
to federal violations, especially when the additional state remedy upsets the particular 
balancing of costs and benefits enshrined by the federal statute.127 State efforts 
simply to enforce federal law, however—without the provision of any additional 
remedies—occupy less certain legal terrain. Modern case law fails to provide a 
definitive, transsubstantive rule for addressing this particular issue.128 The status of 
these state efforts likely depends on the rationale underlying the particular federal 
enforcement policy they are intended to supplement. When federal enforcement levels 
stem merely from resource constraints, it is entirely possible that state assistance will 
pose no obstacle to achieving congressional purposes. If federal “underenforcement” 
is a result of careful policy calibration by the President or Congress, however, state 
supplementation may disrupt that balance and therefore be preempted.129 
E. Statutes that Purport to Nullify Federal Law 
Many opposition statutes declare that a particular federal law, or one of its 
applications, is unconstitutional and therefore void. Other statutes implicitly nullify 
federal law by outlawing the specific policy choice that it enshrines. Both variations 
tend to phrase their objections in the language of reserved and enumerated powers. 
Although statutes of this variety occasionally include a mechanism for preventing the 
enforcement of federal law, those that do are reserved for later consideration. The laws 
addressed in this subpart, which lack affirmative enforcement provisions, merely 
purport to provide a rule of decision for courts. 
Utah’s Firearms Freedom Act is a prototypical example of a statute designed to 
nullify a particular application of federal law. The Utah Act, echoing historical 
                                                                                                                 
 
grown increasingly hesitant to read implicit field-preemption clauses into federal statutes.”). 
 126. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The other form of conflict preemption—
triggered when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility,” Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes 
Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)—typically will not 
be implicated by statutes that merely seek to supplement federal enforcement efforts. 
 127. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001) (holding 
that states may not provide supplemental remedies for fraud committed against the Food and 
Drug Administration); Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 
U.S. 282, 288 (1986) (holding that supplemental state remedies to the National Labor 
Relations Act are preempted). 
 128. James A. Kraehenbuehl, Lessons from the Past: How the Antebellum Fugitive Slave 
Debate Informs State Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1491 
(2011) (noting that “modern preemption case law does not address the specific enforcement 
question asked by jurisdictions of overenforcement like Arizona: To what extent can a state 
overenforce a federal law by using state resources to arrest, detain, and prosecute people in 
violation of the federal law?”). 
 129. Cf. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–74 (2000) (finding that 
sanctions adopted by Massachusetts targeting Myanmar were preempted on the ground that they 
upset the careful policy calibration made by Congress in enacting sanctions at the federal level). 
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theorists, explicitly characterizes the Constitution as a contract between the federal 
government and the sovereign states.130 With this constitutional vision131 as its 
foundation, the Act provides: 
In reviewing any matter covered by this chapter, a court shall consider 
the following: . . . A personal firearm, a firearm action or receiver, a 
firearm accessory, or ammunition that is manufactured commercially or 
privately in the state to be used or sold within the state is not subject to 
federal law or federal regulation, including registration, under the 
authority of congress to regulate interstate commerce.132 
As a result, the regulation of such firearms is reserved to the state under the Tenth 
Amendment.133 Although the Utah Act does not explicitly reference any particular 
federal statute, such as the National Firearms Act,134 its unmistakable intention is to 
nullify legislation that infringes state control of the intrastate gun trade. 
Virginia’s response to the ACA exemplifies those statutes that outlaw a particular 
substantive policy adopted by the federal government. The Virginia Healthcare 
Freedom Act provides that “[n]o resident of this Commonwealth . . . shall be required 
to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage except as required by 
a court or the Department of Social Services where an individual is named a party in 
a judicial or administrative proceeding.”135 Although it does not reference the ACA, 
the plain purpose of the Virginia Act is to nullify the individual mandate provision of 
that law.136 As the related litigation indicates, Virginia’s bill is predicated on a 
constitutional claim that the individual mandate exceeds Congress’ authority under the 
Commerce Clause.137 
The juxtaposition of the Utah and Virginia bills illustrates an important analytical 
point. On its face, the Utah legislation is purely declaratory: it does not endeavor to 
create any legal rights or obligations but merely recognizes certain constraints on 
federal power (allegedly) imposed by the Constitution. In contrast, the Virginia law 
purports to create an immunity138: it is intended to supply, by its own force, a rule of 
decision for state courts. The difficulty, of course, is that states are incapable of 
limiting federal power by edict. The immunity created by the Virginia bill will only 
be operative if the Constitution renders conflicting federal law invalid. In that case, 
the bill would be superfluous, insofar as an unconstitutional federal law fails to 
supply a rule of decision regardless of whether the state says as much. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5b-102 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 131. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, State Standing To Challenge Ultra Vires Federal Action: 
The Health Care Cases and Beyond, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 322–25 (2012) 
(discussing and criticizing the compact theory of the Constitution). 
 132. § 53-5b-102. 
 133. Id. 
 134. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934). 
 135. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2014). 
 136. Timothy S. Jost, Can the States Nullify Health Care Reform?, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
869, 869 (2010). 
 137. See Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 601 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 138. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 55 (1913) (explaining the concept of an immunity). 
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Thus, despite their differing formal structures, neither piece of legislation is 
capable of establishing immunity from federal obligations. The effect of each is 
ultimately reducible to the viability of its constitutional arguments. Although the two 
statutes are analytically distinct, they are addressed together in this subpart because 
they are identical in both functional and rhetorical effect.139 They are not included in 
subpart II.A., which encompasses purely expressive laws, because their plain text does 
purport to alter the legal relations that exist under current federal law. 
Statutes that declare federal law invalid represent the modern incarnation of classic 
nullification measures.140 If the federal legislation they target is itself constitutional, 
these statutes will be uniformly preempted under the Supremacy Clause.141 Because 
their operative effects are largely congruent with their constitutional claims, such 
statutes cannot survive judicial decisions that reject the constitutional interpretations 
upon which they are predicated. In this context it is important to note that a state or 
federal court engaged in determining the validity of federal law will not be bound by 
the nullifying legislature’s judgment of constitutionality.142 
F. Statutes that Hinder Federal Law Enforcement 
The most combative efforts to oppose the enforcement of federal law take the 
form of statutes threatening federal executive officers with criminal punishment for 
acts taken contrary to state policy. Statutes in this class typically nullify federal law 
and further provide that any officer who attempts to enforce the nullified law will be 
subject to state penalties. Although several such statutes have been proposed in 
recent years,143 their actual passage is relatively rare. 
The Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act represents one of the few enacted statutes 
penalizing federal agents simply for fulfilling their official responsibilities. It 
provides that any official “who enforces or attempts to enforce” any federal law upon 
a firearm that “is manufactured commercially or privately in Wyoming and that 
remains exclusively within the borders of Wyoming shall be guilty of a misdemeanor 
and, upon conviction, shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, 
a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or both.”144 
The Wyoming provision is predicated on a narrow reading of Congress’ power 
under the Commerce Clause, which the state contends does not authorize regulation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. The rhetorical tenor of a nullification statute is important because it is instrumental in 
shaping the statute’s tendency to promote divisive sectionalism and undermine national unity. 
See infra notes 331–343 and accompanying text. 
 140. See generally supra Part I. 
 141. Leonard, supra note 12, at 117. 
 142. The Oath Clause requires both federal and state judges to uphold the Constitution 
faithfully: “all . . . judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall 
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 143. See, e.g., S.B. 1178, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (declaring that goods 
produced and sold exclusively within the state are beyond the authority of the federal 
commerce power and providing that any federal agent attempting to enforce federal law in 
contravention of the statute will be guilty of a felony). 
 144. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-405(b) (2013). 
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of the intrastate manufacture and transfer of firearms.145 According to this theory, 
any federal law that justifies a violation of the Act is itself unconstitutional. A federal 
officer seeking to enforce such a law is therefore acting ultra vires. Consequently, 
the state is (allegedly) entitled to respond to the federal agent’s conduct in the same 
manner it would respond to the actions of a private lawbreaker. 
As the previous subpart noted, statutes that purport to nullify federal law will be 
preempted insofar as the targeted legislation is itself deemed constitutional.146 
Similarly, statutes that actively interfere with the enforcement of a valid federal law 
“stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress” and thus will be invalidated under standard conflict 
preemption principles.147 
This latter conclusion is arguably buttressed by the doctrine of Supremacy Clause 
immunity, recognized in In re Neagle,148 which immunizes a federal officer from 
state prosecution if his allegedly criminal conduct was both authorized by federal 
law and necessary and proper to the performance of his official duties.149 It is unclear, 
however, whether Neagle shields an officer from criminal liability if his conduct was 
authorized by what is later determined to be an unconstitutional federal law. A court 
faced with this scenario might draw an analogy to qualified immunity in the § 1983 
context and grant the officer immunity unless he violated a clearly established 
constitutional prohibition.150 The precedents and scholarship on the scope of 
Supremacy Clause immunity, however, are notoriously sparse.151 For purposes of 
subsequent analysis, it is sufficient merely to recognize that most statutes in this 
category will be overridden by federal law. 
III. PURPOSES SERVED BY STATE OPPOSITION LAWS 
This Part provides a taxonomy of the various purposes that opposition statutes 
may serve, apart from those expressed in their text and despite any constraints 
imposed by federal law. Both preempted and nonpreempted statutes, for instance, 
may produce significant political ramifications, as well as a host of indirect legal 
consequences. The chief purposes furthered by opposition statutes fall into three main 
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. Id. at § 6-8-404(a). This narrow reading, obviously, is in tension with the broad 
reading given to the Clause by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 
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 146. See Balloun, supra note 38, at 222 (“[T]he main thrust of any argument Wyoming 
raises before the federal judiciary must be that the federal law in conflict with the Act is illegal 
and void.”); Jost, supra note 136, at 869. 
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classes: expressing dissent, influencing adjudication, and affecting federal policy.152 
Each class can be further subdivided into a cluster of related functions. The subparts 
below explore the three major categories and their various permutations in detail. 
A. Expressing Dissent 
One of the primary aims advanced by opposition statutes is the expression of 
dissent. Purely declaratory resolutions obviously serve this purpose. Laws that 
exempt federally prohibited conduct from state penalties, as well as legislation that 
bars state officers from enforcing federal law,153 also communicate disapproval. 
Even many preempted statutes, however—such as those that declare federal law 
void—remain capable of fulfilling a similar expressive function.154 Communicating 
dissent is one of the most pervasive and important purposes served by the modern 
generation of sovereignty laws. 
States, like other political organizations, serve as effective institutions for rallying 
and channeling opposition. In enacting statutes condemning federal policy, states are 
capable of uniting disparate groups and providing a concrete, unified platform for 
resistance.155 These efforts frequently provide a voice to dissenters who might 
otherwise be silenced156 and bring public salience to issues that might otherwise be 
submerged.157 As Alexander Hamilton observed, the states “will constantly have 
their attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, 
if anything improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and . . . to be the 
VOICE . . . of their discontent.”158 
State acts of protest generate a wealth of ripple effects. They serve to codify 
dissent and thus provide Congress with valuable information on the geographical 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. These categories are obviously permeable: the expression of dissent, for instance, may 
impact federal policy. Nevertheless, they represent a useful, functional tool for analyzing the 
real-world effects of state resistance. 
 153. The anticommandeering rule, which enables states to withhold assistance from federal 
enforcement efforts, may serve as the federalism analog of the First Amendment rule against 
compelled speech: the former protects the right of states to decline to express support for federal 
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support for governmental positions they oppose. Hills, supra note 12, at 906–15. 
 154. Leonard, supra note 12, at 167. 
 155. See Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in 
the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1285 (2004); Hays, supra note 40, 
at 205–06. 
 156. Leonard, supra note 12, at 164; see also Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. 
L. REV. 317, 403–04 (1997); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Rhetoric Hits the Road: State 
Challenges to the Affordable Care Act Implementation, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 785 (2012). 
 157. Card, supra note 13, at 1826; see also Leonard, supra note 12, at 167–68. 
 158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton). Like committees of correspondence 
during the Revolutionary War, states may “open a correspondence and generally overcome 
collective action problems that might otherwise hinder opposition to federal policies through 
such mechanisms as hortatory resolutions and coordination of plans of resistance.” Hills, supra 
note 12, at 915 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this sense, states will be “so many 
sentinels” over the activities of the federal government. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
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popularity of certain policies.159 They may also help to educate the public regarding 
both the implementation process associated with complicated federal programs and 
the particular issues of federalism and personal liberty that those programs raise.160 
Finally, opposition statutes may pressure the state’s congressional representatives to 
adopt a political stance similar to that taken by the state legislature.161 As a result, 
state dissent occasionally exerts a gravitational effect on national discussion: during 
reauthorization hearings for the Patriot Act, for example, representatives repeatedly 
cited state resolutions opposing the bill.162 
Opposition statutes also provide an important expressive outlet for constituencies 
defeated at the national level.163 Antifederal resolutions and other state-level projects 
offer “near-term, feasible targets and the possibility of occasional victories,” even if 
national success is doubtful.164 States’ rights activists, for instance, are far more 
likely to secure passage of an anti-ACA nullification resolution in their state than to 
achieve repeal of the ACA in Congress.165 Plausible objectives of this variety enable 
ongoing mobilization of political opposition despite bleak prospects nationally.166 
Such state-level efforts functionally expand the opportunity for political 
participation: a state’s willingness to enter a national debate provides constituents 
with an alternative forum for voicing their opinions on issues of federal policy.167 
State laws keyed to national controversies provide potential benefits not only to 
disaffected voters but also to dissenting politicians. By maintaining the public 
salience of divisive federal programs like healthcare reform, politicians in minority 
states are able to effectively capitalize on their own opposition to those policies.168 
Voting for a sovereignty bill enables a state politician to derive political capital from 
a national debate in which he plays no direct role, while simultaneously signaling his 
ideological commitments to constituents.169 By positioning the state as a figure in the 
national conversation, the state politician is equally able to portray himself as a figure 
in the national conversation, thereby attracting the votes of constituents who share 
his views on that particular issue.170 
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The final and arguably most significant expressive function served by opposition 
statutes is the modification of social norms. Resolutions that denounce federal policy 
galvanize and amplify dissent, thereby shaping public opinion. Statutes that exempt 
federally prohibited conduct from state penalties, however, operate on a more 
fundamental level by altering the public’s moral and social perceptions of certain 
primary conduct. Social norms are the product of a confluence of complex forces, 
including law,171 which is capable of both communicating nascent norms and 
simultaneously entrenching those norms.172 Law is an important element in fashioning 
the public’s perception of the desirability and propriety of certain types of conduct.173 
When a state sanctions a particular activity, it implicitly asserts that the activity is at 
least tolerable both from the perspective of the authorities and other citizens.174 As a 
result, state statutes that permit conduct otherwise prohibited by federal law have the 
capacity to lessen the social stigma such conduct normally invites.175 
Changing mores in the medical marijuana context exemplify this effect. 
Permitting the use of marijuana as a palliative has had a significant impact on public 
perceptions of its morality and social acceptability: “Simply by allowing their 
residents to use marijuana for medical purposes, the states have arguably fostered 
more tolerant attitudes toward the practice, making it seem more compassionate, less 
dangerous, and less wicked, thereby removing or softening the personal and societal 
reproach that once suppressed medical use of the drug.”176 
Statutes of this variety also interact with norms regarding obedience to law. State 
legalization reduces the moral dissonance experienced by those who desire to use 
marijuana for medical purposes but also desire to obey legal commands.177 This is 
particularly true if, as some have argued, citizens perceive the state as a more 
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legitimate repository of authority than the federal government and thus are more 
willing to accept state directives as indicative of their true legal obligations.178 State 
leniency may thus enable citizens to engage in federally prohibited activities without 
sacrificing their sense of legal duty. 
B. Influencing Adjudication 
Sovereignty laws can also have a significant effect on constitutional adjudication, 
at all stages of the judicial process: they may catalyze private lawsuits, trigger standing 
for purposes of federal jurisdiction, and even influence the content of substantive 
doctrine. As with the expressive functions described in the previous subpart, federal 
preemption will not preclude a statute from serving this purpose. The following 
analysis explores the potential impact of sovereignty laws at each stage of litigation. 
As a threshold matter, opposition statutes may encourage state residents to bring 
suits challenging the offensive federal law. State legislation condemning a particular 
enactment implicitly suggests to potential plaintiffs that they will enjoy the support 
of the state should they choose to challenge that enactment in court. Some states even 
make this promise of support explicit. Idaho’s Healthcare Freedom Act, for instance, 
declares that “every person within the state of Idaho is and shall be free to choose or 
decline to choose any mode of securing health care services without penalty”179 and 
requires the attorney general to take action “in the defense or prosecution of rights 
protected under this act.”180 In other cases, backers of a bill may work behind the 
scenes to select an appropriate plaintiff.181 
Functionally, these statutes thus spur state citizens to violate federal law (thereby 
generating a constitutional lawsuit) by implicitly or explicitly vouching the support of 
the state in the ensuing litigation.182 They further attempt to frame the conceptual scope 
of such litigation by codifying the constitutional basis for the state’s objections. A 
provision of the Idaho anti-ACA statute, for instance, espouses an enumerated powers 
argument against federal healthcare reform.183 Provisions of this variety provide a 
strategic plan of attack to guide plaintiffs once litigation commences.184 
Sovereignty statutes can also influence the jurisdictional analysis of federal courts 
in two ways.185 First, by implicitly sanctioning illegal activity—such as the 
manufacturing of firearms in violation of federal regulations—opposition laws 
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arguably contribute to the existence of a justiciable controversy. This was the 
approach endorsed by proponents of the Montana Firearms Freedom Act, which 
purports to exempt from federal regulation those firearms that are produced in 
Montana and remain in-state.186 Drafters of the bill publicly admitted that they 
intended to locate an ideal plaintiff to threaten to manufacture firearms in compliance 
with state law (and therefore in violation of federal law) in order to generate a 
controversy ripe for judicial resolution.187 
In accordance with this strategy, following passage of the statute, a Montana gun 
manufacturer filed suit in federal court, seeking an injunction against the 
enforcement of contrary federal regulations.188 Consistent with its implicit promise 
of support, Montana intervened in the suit to defend its statute.189 Plaintiff’s standing 
arguments centered on the existence of the state enactment: he contended that 
hundreds of potential customers were only willing to purchase his firearms if they 
were manufactured pursuant to the Montana bill.190 Federal law prevented him from 
taking advantage of this market, thus allegedly creating a ripe controversy.191 The 
district court dismissed the claim on jurisdictional grounds.192 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed on the standing issue—finding that plaintiff had demonstrated the 
existence of economic injury—but dismissed on the merits.193 As this episode 
illustrates, the effectiveness of opposition statutes in helping to generate jurisdiction 
will typically be highly fact-dependent. 
The second avenue by which these statutes may trigger federal jurisdiction is 
through the fabrication of injury-in-fact for state standing purposes. Virginia’s 
opposition to federal healthcare reform exemplifies this strategy. The Virginia 
Healthcare Freedom Act, which purported to nullify the ACA,194 was specifically 
intended to render justiciable Virginia’s challenge to the constitutionality of the 
ACA’s individual mandate provision.195 Since the individual mandate imposes no 
duties on the states themselves, Virginia was forced to rely on the conflict between 
federal law and its nullification statute to establish standing.196 According to the state, 
the “collision between the state and federal schemes . . . creates an immediate, actual 
controversy involving antagonistic assertions of right.”197 
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States are permitted to litigate as parens patriae to protect the collective interests 
of their citizens, but Massachusetts v. Mellon bars states proceeding under this 
doctrine from challenging federal law.198 The Mellon bar does not apply, however, 
to suits where a state seeks merely to protect its own sovereign interests against 
federal intrusion.199 Sovereign interests include, among other things, “the power to 
create and enforce a legal code.”200 Thus, the crucial question in the Virginia 
litigation was whether the state sought to vindicate a sovereign interest or instead to 
litigate as parens patriae. The suit could proceed only in the former circumstance.201 
Virginia contended that federal preemption of its nullification statute infringed its 
power to establish and administer a legal code.202 The Fourth Circuit, however, focused 
on the conjunctive language of the relevant formulation: “only when a federal law 
interferes with a state’s exercise of its sovereign power ‘to create and enforce a legal 
code’ does it inflict on the state the requisite injury-in-fact.”203 Since the Virginia 
Healthcare Freedom Act was not enforceable in any meaningful sense—“Virginia lacks 
the sovereign authority to nullify federal law”204—federal preemption of that statute did 
not interfere with the exercise of Virginia’s sovereign prerogatives.205 
The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that Virginia’s actual purpose in pursuing a 
constitutional challenge was to protect its residents from the effects of the ACA.206 
The suit therefore constituted an improper parens patriae proceeding and was 
consequently dismissed for lack of standing.207 In the panel’s view, a state cannot 
simply manufacture a federal constitutional case by passing a statute in opposition to 
federal law.208 State standing is a notoriously complex field, however, and the case 
law on this issue is mixed.209 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis represents a 
plausible interpretation of existing precedent.210 
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Lastly, state opposition may influence adjudication by shaping the content of 
substantive doctrine. A growing body of scholarship acknowledges that Supreme 
Court decisions frequently reflect popular consensus.211 Specifically, public opinion 
often plays an important role “in guiding judicial interpretation of the open-textured 
language” of the Constitution.212 This effect is unsurprising: judges “are influenced 
by changes in constitutional culture” for the simple reason that “they live in this 
culture . . . and absorb its assumptions and presuppositions.”213 The Court’s 
awareness of its own fragile institutional position may also prompt sensitivity to 
public opinion.214 For these reasons, among others, a social movement that promotes 
certain constitutional understandings in the political realm may induce the Court to 
memorialize its viewpoint in formal opinions.215 
The impact of political movements on constitutional adjudication is evidenced by 
a number of significant historical episodes.216 Supporters of the Equal Rights 
Amendment, for instance, ultimately failed in their quest to formally amend the 
Constitution but arguably succeeded as a functional matter when the primary tenets 
of their platform were incorporated into the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence.217 Similarly, the contours of the Second Amendment right recognized 
in District of Columbia v. Heller218 potentially reflect a constitutional consensus 
reached outside the courts in the late twentieth century.219 
The specific effect of opposition statutes on judicial reasoning may take one of 
two forms. First, such statutes can confer prominence on a formerly obscure 
interpretation of a constitutional provision. Successful public mobilization in favor of 
a self-defense-oriented reading of the Second Amendment represents a conspicuous 
example of this phenomenon.220 Second, they can provide an important framing device 
for constitutional objections to a newly announced federal policy. Nullification 
resolutions targeting the ACA, for instance, were premised on the argument that the 
bill was not justified as a legitimate exercise of Congress’ enumerated powers.221 States 
could have taken an alternative route, however, by contending that the ACA infringed 
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certain due process rights in liberty of contract or the doctor-patient relationship.222 By 
choosing to criticize the legislation on federalism grounds, states played an important 
role in shaping the ensuing debate.223 
The impact of these laws on constitutional doctrine is not limited to the context 
of formal adjudication. They can also contribute to the formation of enforceable 
constitutional understandings outside the courts.224 Keith Whittington has famously 
referred to this process—that is, the crystallization of extrajudicial constitutional 
norms—as “constitutional construction.”225 In Whittington’s view, these norms may 
give flesh to areas of textual indeterminacy226 or even reorder the fundamental 
ground rules of a constitutional system.227 Constitutional constructions, although 
typically not ratified by formal judicial opinions, nevertheless achieve a degree of 
permanence that binds future politicians.228 “Even while operating from the inside of 
politics, . . . constructions perform the role that constitutions are supposed to 
perform—they structure and constrain future political debate and government 
action.”229 Because these norms are nonjudicial, political and social mobilizations 
are integral in determining their content.230 
Opposition statutes have the capacity to play an important role in the formation 
of new constitutional constructions. The majority of these bills are fairly recent, and 
thus their impact in this sphere is not yet fully discernible. Their observed effect on 
public opinion, however, indicates their potential significance. State laws legalizing 
medical marijuana, for example, may eventually contribute to a constitutional 
settlement that places the use of medical marijuana beyond federal regulation as a 
matter of the Tenth Amendment, or beyond all regulation as a matter of substantive 
due process.231 Whether this outcome will occur is, of course, speculative—the 
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process of construction on this issue is not yet complete. It is unclear what the 
contours of any eventual construction will be, or even whether a construction will be 
reached. Nevertheless, state legislation has indisputably molded the constitutional 
debate on this issue in important ways thus far.232 
C. Affecting Federal Policy 
Finally, opposition laws are capable of exerting a direct influence on both the 
federal government’s enforcement priorities and its substantive policies. The statutes 
with the most significant real-world impact in this respect fall into two categories: 
those that exempt conduct from state penalties and those that prohibit state officers 
from assisting in the enforcement of federal law.233 The former may convince the 
federal government to allocate enforcement resources elsewhere in order to address 
conduct criminalized under both state and federal regimes, while the latter may 
induce the federal government to alter its substantive policies in order to coax states 
into offering enforcement assistance. 
The War on Drugs represents the most prominent setting in which state laws have 
significantly influenced federal enforcement priorities. The federal government lacks 
the resources to comprehensively enforce its marijuana ban: “[o]nly 1 percent of the 
roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal 
authorities.”234 As a result, the federal government must carefully choose where to 
allocate its enforcement capital. Widespread state legalization235 of medical236 
marijuana has apparently convinced the Department of Justice (DOJ) to moderate its 
prosecution of individuals who use the drug in compliance with state regulations.237 
Attorney General Eric Holder announced in 2009 that “it will not be a priority to use 
federal resources to prosecute patients with serious illnesses or their caregivers who are 
complying with state laws on medical marijuana.”238 
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A contemporaneous memorandum issued to United States Attorneys reaffirms 
this policy,239 but is careful to note that “clear and unambiguous compliance with 
state law” does not “create a legal defense to a violation of the Controlled Substances 
Act.”240 The policy contained in the memorandum is therefore “intended solely as a 
guide to the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion.”241 Thus, although 
state medical marijuana statutes are incapable of neutralizing federal penalties, they 
have achieved limited success by prompting (at least for now) a reallocation of 
federal enforcement resources.242 The current policy may even survive the transition 
to a new administration insofar as it creates reliance interests and special interest 
groups that serve as impediments to change. 
Opposition statutes are also capable of influencing the federal government’s 
substantive agenda. Enactments that prohibit state officers from assisting in the 
enforcement of federal law are especially likely to have this effect for two reasons. 
First, state opposition can sensitize federal officials to constitutional concerns they 
had not previously been inclined to address. This phenomenon may already have 
materialized in the War on Terror, where local opposition to Patriot Act enforcement 
has repeatedly forced federal officials to publicly confront civil liberties issues that 
they would have preferred to ignore.243 
Second, the federal government may be inclined to modify its position in order to 
induce state enforcement assistance. The War on Terror again serves as a 
paradigmatic example. Federal authorities lack the manpower to ensure national 
security on their own.244 And, under the anticommandeering rule, the federal 
government cannot mandate that state officers provide aid.245 It therefore has a 
powerful incentive to moderate its substantive position in order to persuade reluctant 
or dissenting states to cooperate.246 In short, federal dependence on state assistance 
may compel national lawmakers to grant concessions to state concerns in order to 
achieve federal policy objectives.247 Although the secrecy surrounding Patriot Act 
implementation makes a comprehensive evaluation difficult, certain indicators 
suggest that an effect of this nature may already have occurred.248 
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IV. TRANSSUBSTANTIVE CHARACTERISTICS 
As the prior Part illustrates, contemporary opposition statutes are designed to 
serve a multitude of legal and political purposes. The obvious unifying characteristic 
of these laws is resistance to federal policy. Several other properties, however, also 
tend to permeate the field. First, opposition statutes frequently use language that 
characterizes the offensive federal legislation not merely as unwise but as 
unconstitutional. Enactments that explicitly adopt a constitutional stance are 
important instruments in the process of constitutional politics. Second, sovereignty 
laws tend to be characterized by a remarkably variable political orientation. Members 
of both the traditional left and right repeatedly invoke principles of state autonomy 
to justify deviation from the national norm. This feature lends credence to theories 
of opportunistic federalism. Third, opposition statutes are universally territorial: 
insofar as they purport to invalidate or impede federal policy, they do so only within 
the physical borders of the complaining state. This Part explores each of these 
unifying traits in turn. 
A. Constitutional Language 
Constitutional claims form the centerpiece of a wide array of state sovereignty 
laws. Expressive statutes, obviously, are riddled with constitutional language, as 
exemplified by the widespread enactment of Tenth Amendment resolutions.249 Laws 
that exempt federally prohibited conduct from state penalties incorporate 
constitutional arguments less frequently, but enumerated powers objections are 
beginning to emerge in the medical marijuana context.250 Prohibitions on state 
participation in federal enforcement efforts occasionally incorporate constitutional 
standards by barring assistance only when it would entail unconstitutional conduct 
on the part of state officers.251 Finally, statutes that declare federal law invalid,252 as 
well as those that provide for the arrest of federal officers,253 almost universally 
predicate their claims on independent interpretations of the Constitution. The only 
initiatives that do not employ constitutional arguments are those intended to 
supplement federal law enforcement.254 
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Grounding state opposition in the Constitution serves two distinct purposes. First, 
it helps impart an aura of legitimacy to a historically suspect enterprise. Nullification 
and other forms of state resistance are commonly associated with such besmirched 
causes as Southern independence and racial segregation.255 Furthermore, as a purely 
conceptual matter, nullification can easily be characterized as an act of usurpation—
from a constitutional perspective, it is perfectly clear that states do not possess the 
authority to unilaterally override federal law.256 
Phrasing state objections in constitutional terms simultaneously solves both of 
these problems. First, the use of constitutional language helps to cleanse the states’ 
rights project of its checkered history by aligning modern foes of particular federal 
policies with the “true” meaning of the Constitution.257 This strategy permits 
proponents of state autonomy to portray themselves as working within the confines 
of a national system to defend the Constitution against federal distortion and 
misappropriation.258 In this light, modern-day nullifiers are not traitorous 
malcontents, but rather vigorous dissenters striving to preserve and perpetuate 
fundamental American principles. 
Second, constitutional rhetoric helps to rebut the critique that state opposition—
in particular, state nullification—represents an act of usurpation. The Supremacy 
Clause provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . , 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”259 On its face, this language appears to render nullification statutes 
categorically illegitimate. In order for a federal law to trigger the Supremacy Clause, 
however, it must conform to constitutional rules.260 A federal statute that offends the 
Constitution is not law at all, for purposes of the Supremacy Clause or otherwise.261 
Nullification statutes play off this analysis by asserting that the targeted federal 
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legislation is unconstitutional. If their reasoning is meritorious, the Supremacy 
Clause will be inapplicable. Constitutional claims thus enable nullification bills to 
sidestep outright defiance of higher law. 
Apart from legitimizing a potentially subversive enterprise, the use of 
constitutional language also empowers states to play a role in the development of 
constitutional doctrine. As discussed in the previous Part, sovereignty laws may 
affect the trajectory and content of both judicial precedent and constitutional 
construction.262 State legislatures that enact statutes designed to resist federal policy 
are thus engaged in a form of popular constitutionalism, or “constitutional advocacy 
outside of the courts.”263 
The fact that these constitutional claims are employed in the service of political 
agendas does not automatically render them disingenuous or invalid.264 The use of 
constitutional rhetoric by social movements places their claims on a different plane 
than those phrased in the vocabulary of ordinary partisan disagreement; the former may 
result in binding constitutional constructions, while the latter will not. Political crusades 
that explicitly frame their arguments in constitutional terms thus cannot be disregarded 
simply on the grounds that their constitutional objectives shade into their political ones. 
In fact, popular constitutionalists actually “reinscribe the authority of the 
law/politics distinction.”265 Constitutional argumentation in the political realm 
reflects a self-conscious decision by a social movement to engage in a qualitatively 
distinct mode of discourse.266 State legislators who ground their arguments in 
constitutional law rather than mere politics necessarily embrace and reaffirm the 
distinction between the two. The invocation of constitutional principles is not merely 
a politically expedient rhetorical strategy; instead, it is a mechanism for bringing the 
nation’s ultimate law to bear on the deepest issues of national identity. By drawing 
on unifying, overarching principles to advance political agendas, opposition statutes 
reinforce constitutional supremacy and relevance.267 
B. Political Diversity 
The second transsubstantive characteristic of opposition statutes is their variable 
political valence. State efforts to undermine federal policy originate with legislators 
and activists across the political spectrum.268 Nullification is traditionally associated 
with conservative ideology, and many stereotypically right-wing causes are 
represented among the multitude of modern opposition measures. Efforts to impede 
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federal gun control or thwart national healthcare reform serve as prototypical 
examples. A significant number of these statutes, however—including medical 
marijuana laws and bills enacted in opposition to foreign interventionism269—are 
more closely associated with liberal ideology. Less mainstream political philosophies, 
such as libertarianism270 and localism,271 also find expression in at least a handful of 
antifederal enactments. Many resistance efforts are even bipartisan.272 This variability 
has a lengthy pedigree; historical instances of state opposition similarly embody a 
pattern of unstable political affiliation.273 
These examples should be sufficient to refute any superficial perception that state 
resistance efforts are driven exclusively by conservative interests. The political 
diversity of the contemporary sovereignty movement lends credence to theories of 
opportunistic federalism, which posit that arguments about the structural allocation 
of authority between states and the federal government “are mere proxies for 
substantive objections to particular laws and policies.”274 These theories necessarily 
rely on the observation that federalism “is an empty normative shell”275 that can be 
invoked to support an infinite variety of political agendas. The primary hypothesis 
of such theories is that commitments to federal values are typically based on transient 
convenience rather than principle.276 Historical patterns and contemporary politics 
tend to confirm this conjecture.277 
Opportunistic federalism may be undesirable for a number of reasons. First, the 
value of appeals to state autonomy is degraded by excessive opportunism. Advocates 
of states’ rights on particular issues may be ineffective if the public perceives that their 
“commitment” to local diversity is merely a convenient rhetorical device for promoting 
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an unrelated substantive position.278 Second, as noted above, the prevalence of 
opportunism in this context reflects the absence of a principled commitment to 
federalism as a stand-alone constitutional feature.279 If federal limits are only applied 
when convenient, they may be underenforced. Principles invoked exclusively to 
achieve certain ends will be ignored when they are not useful to achieve those ends—
even if, as a neutral matter of text or structure, their application is warranted. 
Finally, pervasive opportunism may deter even those who hold a principled 
commitment to federalism from adhering to their beliefs. As Ilya Somin and John 
McGinnis argue: 
In the absence of a credible commitment to federalism, it is irrational . . . 
even for those who would prefer a consistent respect for federalism to 
their particular first order substantive policies to act on such preferences. 
They have no assurance that their political opponents will similarly 
respect federalism. If they hold back on pursuing their preferred policies 
for the sake of federalism, they take a risk that their forbearance will 
result in neither a coherent federalism nor their preferred substantive 
policies.280 
Despite its drawbacks, this type of opportunism is nevertheless capable of 
indirectly serving structural interests. In the absence of a principled federalism, the 
utility of states’ rights as a convenient, temporary political tool may actually be 
necessary to ensure the long-term preservation of state autonomy.281 State 
legislatures and executives arguably represent a sufficiently diverse collection of 
political views that, regardless of the particular national policy at stake, at least some 
state actors will resist it on federalism grounds.282 Ongoing friction between state and 
federal governments—whether it stems from a principled or opportunistic appeal to 
federal values—assists in policing the federal balance of power.283 The repeated 
invocation of state autonomy by a host of different agents thus represents an 
important mechanism for preserving federalism as a structural principle.284 
C. Territorialism 
The third unifying characteristic of state opposition efforts is their territorialism. 
This particular feature accompanies sovereignty laws of every stripe. Statutes that 
remove state penalties for federally prohibited conduct, for instance, affect only 
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in-state behavior.285 Measures that bar state officials from implementing federal 
law,286 as well as those that supplement federal enforcement efforts,287 also tend to 
exclusively affect the operations of the enacting state. Similarly, statutes that purport 
to invalidate federal law or hinder its enforcement universally declare that their 
effects are confined to state residents and purely intrastate conduct.288 Expressive 
statutes represent the only category of Part II’s taxonomy that arguably lacks this 
characteristic. Nevertheless, even resolutions of this ilk frequently include language 
indicating that the expressed views are those of the state and its residents alone.289 
The territorial quality of these enactments obviously does not imply a similar 
limitation on their consequences—as noted, many opposition statutes are expressly 
designed to influence national policy.290 Nevertheless, sovereignty laws are universally 
territorial in their direct effects. Nullification, in both its historical and modern 
incarnations, is an intrinsically defensive mechanism, designed to interpose the state 
between its citizens and an allegedly tyrannical federal government. This dynamic 
illustrates James Madison’s famous observation that federalism creates a “double 
security” for individual rights by empowering and motivating competing sovereigns to 
thwart the development of excessive concentrations of power.291 Opposition statutes 
represent an important tool in state efforts to ensure that regional interests are not 
overrun by an “irresistible gravitation of all power” to the central government.292 
Territorialism represents a necessary consequence of certain practical realities. In 
depriving the federal government of law enforcement assistance, for example, a state 
can only withhold its own resources; it cannot mandate that other states do the same. 
Similarly, the removal of state penalties for federally prohibited conduct will, by 
practical necessity, be confined in scope to the jurisdiction of the legalizing state. 
Although individual states may call on their sisters to join in an opposition effort,293 
they lack the authority to command them to do so. Constitutional text also plays a 
role in producing the territorial quality of many sovereignty laws. Statutes that 
purport to insulate purely intrastate activity from federal regulation on the grounds 
that such conduct falls outside the purview of the Commerce Clause,294 for instance, 
are necessarily territorial.295 These enactments explicitly refer to state borders as an 
essential element of their constitutional theories. 
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Territorialism is not only inevitable in many respects, however, but can also be 
beneficial. For instance, it both encourages regional variation and decentralizes 
power. “So long as preferences for government policies are unevenly distributed 
among the various localities, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decision 
making than by a single national authority.”296 This principle holds true not only in 
contexts where states originate first-order policies but also in those situations where 
they attempt to counteract the effects of certain federal statutes. Voters’ appetite for 
resistance to federal law, like their appetite for any policy, varies geographically. The 
territorial character of opposition statutes confines their expressive and functional 
impact to those populations willing to bear the negative consequences associated 
with active dissent.297 
V. ASSESSING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS 
The analysis to this point has been purely descriptive. State resistance efforts, 
however, also raise complex normative questions regarding the permissible scope 
and character of state action in a federal system. This Part tentatively concludes that 
opposition laws are desirable insofar as they safely promote the benefits of 
decentralization within the constraints imposed by a national union. The chief 
purpose of the following analysis, however, is primarily to establish a framework for 
assessing the relevant issues—not to furnish definitive conclusions. Many of the 
normative questions raised by state opposition laws are not amenable to clean 
conceptual or empirical resolution, but identifying these statutes’ principal benefits 
and costs represents an important first step in constructing the analytical framework 
necessary for further study.298 The following skeletal analysis thus attempts to lay 
the groundwork for future debate.299 
Viewed charitably, opposition statutes produce a multitude of benefits. First, they 
provide a check on erroneous federal constitutional interpretations. Second, as a tool 
of constitutional politics, they deepen political discourse and strengthen the 
Constitution’s democratic legitimacy. Third, they further the traditional federalism 
values of regional diversity and satisfaction of local preferences. Like any complex 
social phenomenon, however, the sovereignty movement is also characterized by a 
number of potential downsides. Nullification efforts have historically posed serious 
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threats to national unity and served as major obstacles to the implementation of 
federal policy. Furthermore, even moderate forms of interpretive pluralism may be 
conducive to anarchy or detrimental to the rule of law. This Part explores each of 
these potential ramifications in turn. 
One of the principal upsides of state opposition is its capacity to limit the impact 
of spurious constitutional interpretations championed by the federal government. 
State officers who predicate their dissent on the Constitution necessarily assert at 
least a limited degree of interpretive autonomy.300 As a result, opposition statutes 
frequently constitute a form of vertical departmentalism, representing the efforts of 
state actors to interpret the Constitution without regard to the interpretations favored 
by federal entities.301 Modern assertions of state interpretive autonomy typically 
occur in the interstices of national supremacy, that is, in situations where state action 
is shielded by the anticommandeering rule or in contexts where the state is not subject 
to a direct court order resolving the precise question at issue.302 
The major drawback of a federal monopoly on constitutional meaning is that it 
insulates interpretive errors from correction.303 Vertical departmentalism ameliorates 
this failing. Although contemporary opposition leaders respect the authority of 
judicial decrees in litigated cases to which the state is a party,304 they decline to accept 
judicial dictates as legislating universal rules of conduct.305 This approach curbs the 
reach of federal constitutional interpretations and, by amplifying dissent, encourages 
the federal government to fully consider alternative arguments before definitively 
imposing its preferred vision. 
In addition to blunting the impact of erroneous federal interpretations, state 
resistance may affirmatively promote the pursuit of truth: “[i]t is more likely that the 
law will be interpreted faithfully when that interpretation is the product of the 
interaction of competing views, fighting for either supremacy or consensus,”306 than 
when a single decision maker enjoys autocratic discretion. Interpretive pluralism 
affords a voice to a wider slice of the political spectrum than does a model of judicial 
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exclusivity, which may be prone to favoring establishment viewpoints. In short, 
vertical departmentalism breaks the federal monopoly on interpretation and subjects 
constitutional meaning to the marketplace of ideas.307 
Furthermore, a diffuse approach to constitutional interpretation is arguably more 
congruous with the broader constitutional scheme of decentralization than is a system 
of pure federal interpretive supremacy.308 Various constitutional mechanisms operate 
to create “gridlock” in the process of policy formulation. Interpretive gridlock 
advances many of the same purposes—such as compelling deliberation and 
preventing dangerous concentrations of power—that policy gridlock does.309 
These benefits, however, are accompanied by a symmetrical cost: just as 
interpretive pluralism may obstruct the implementation of incorrect federal 
decisions, so too may it obstruct the implementation of correct ones.310 This 
particular hazard is minimized by the fact that modern nullifiers accept judicial 
supremacy in cases to which they are parties.311 A nullifying state can thus be induced 
to retract its position if conclusive litigation demonstrates that its constitutional 
arguments are untenable. Judicial decrees are not a panacea, however—states that 
exempt federally prohibited conduct from state penalties or withhold enforcement 
assistance are protected by the anticommandeering rule from interference by courts. 
Nevertheless, the federal government is still free to muster its own resources to 
enforce federal law in those states. 
Consequently, regardless of the type of state opposition at issue, federal 
authorities have the ultimate power to impose their policy vision (assuming that 
vision is constitutional). Rather than fatally undermining federal supremacy, active 
resistance merely ensures that sufficient accord exists to warrant imposing the federal 
government’s stance on outlier states.312 Modern forms of opposition may fragment 
weak consensuses predicated on specious constitutional interpretations but will not 
ultimately prevent the implementation of a constitutional vision supported by a truly 
national understanding.313 
The second potential benefit produced by opposition statutes relates to their effect 
on “constitutional consciousness.”314 Confiding exclusive interpretive authority to a 
single body, such as the Supreme Court, may have the practical effect of reducing 
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the likelihood that other governmental actors will take their constitutional obligations 
seriously.315 State legislators, for instance, are less likely to carefully consider the 
constitutional implications of statutes they enact if their own views on the subject are 
accorded zero weight.316 In contrast, state participation in constitutional politics 
increases popular awareness of our founding principles and deepens individual 
commitments to observe them.317 Vertical departmentalism decentralizes the 
interpretive enterprise, thereby involving a greater number of governmental officers 
in the task of constitutional articulation.318 This process expands the scope and depth 
of constitutional discourse,319 transforming idle onlookers into active participants in 
the constitutional project. 
State involvement in this deliberative give-and-take may also serve to revitalize 
the Constitution’s democratic legitimacy.320 “The ability of people to criticize the 
Constitution-in-practice in the name of the Constitution and to work to push it toward 
their desired vision is what helps make an ancient document newly legitimate to each 
generation of Americans.”321 Vesting interpretive authority solely in the judiciary has 
the potential to alienate individual citizens from the constitutional text and the values 
it embodies.322 In contrast, state opposition efforts enable local populations to 
participate in the Constitution’s development, thereby motivating them to become 
informed and engaged on constitutional issues.323 This process produces feedback 
effects; the greater quantity of discourse generated by state activism tends to educate 
the public and endow constitutional disputes with a heightened degree of public 
salience, thus stimulating further state involvement.324 
Finally, state resistance promotes the traditional values of federalism, including 
increased democratic participation, interjurisdictional competition, and the 
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heightened satisfaction of local preferences.325 By expanding the outlets available for 
individuals to express themselves on national issues, opposition efforts plainly 
broaden the scope of civic involvement.326 They also foment competition between 
states with respect to both first-order policies (e.g., allocating enforcement resources) 
and second-order policies (expressing dissatisfaction with federal law).327 Finally, 
state control over the use of state enforcement resources tends to satisfy local 
preferences more effectively than would a blanket national policy. 
It is important to note that in all of these circumstances the potential for state 
action is symmetrical; states that support federal policy may pass resolutions 
expressing their views, enact laws providing assistance to federal authorities, and 
generally take any action parallel to that which a dissenting state might take. A 
jurisdiction’s stance with respect to federal policy thus serves as another dimension 
along which it may compete to attract residents.328 
The obvious rejoinder to this line of analysis lies in the observation that federalism 
is intended to permit state variation only within a limited compass. In a federal union, 
states have relatively free rein within a sphere of reserved powers, but cannot 
legitimately diverge with respect to issues on which the national government has 
constitutionally decreed that uniformity prevail.329 Two points serve to rebut this 
particular objection. First, the scope of the federal government’s delegated powers is 
precisely the point of contention for many dissenters.330 General appeals to national 
supremacy thus beg the question rather than answer it. Second, as noted, sovereignty 
laws—because they operate merely in the interstices of federal supremacy—can be 
displaced by a sufficiently resolute national consensus. Contemporary resistance 
efforts conspicuously refrain from challenging the federal government’s ultimate 
authority to determine the extent of state power. 
Opposition statutes do, however, pose at least a rhetorical threat to national unity. 
Historically, state resistance repeatedly aroused divisive regional sentiments, in 
addition to occasionally thwarting the exercise of federal power.331 At certain 
junctures, nullification even represented a serious existential threat to federal 
integrity; its most robust incarnation, in the antebellum South, arguably 
foreshadowed the Civil War.332 In assessing the normative validity of modern 
opposition measures, these historical episodes provide a useful point of 
comparison.333 To the extent contemporary sovereignty laws pose similar risks of 
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disunity, their potential costs will likely outweigh their potential benefits.334 
As a form of organized, state-level resistance to federal policy, modern opposition 
statutes plainly bear a superficial resemblance to their predecessors. Beyond this 
elemental similarity, however, they fail to conform to the historical paradigm in a 
number of ways. Several features help to minimize the risks traditionally associated 
with state dissent.335 First, contemporary opposition measures assume a range of 
forms far more diverse than simply nullification per se.336 Declining to provide 
assistance to federal enforcement efforts, for example, is qualitatively different—
both substantively and rhetorically—than outright nullification. The latter poses a far 
greater risk of inciting serious discord. 
Second, and most importantly, even states that purport to invalidate federal law 
categorically accept judicial supremacy in litigated cases to which they are parties. 
States that attempted to nullify the individual mandate provision of the ACA, for 
instance, ultimately acquiesced in judicial resolution of the contested issues.337 The 
policy of deferring to judicial authority was even made explicit in Virginia’s 
nullification statute, which provided that “[n]o resident of this Commonwealth . . . 
shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage 
except as required by a court . . . .”338 Furthermore, proponents of nullification often 
advise state residents to continue to comply with federal law until a conclusive 
adjudication has been obtained.339 
This pervasive deference to judicial supremacy suggests that contemporary 
assertions of state interpretive autonomy will typically be confined to areas of legal 
indeterminacy, where federal supremacy has not been conclusively imposed and a 
plausible space for heterodox state interpretations exists. Those few statutes which 
violate this general rule—such as laws that provide for the arrest of federal officers 
engaged in the performance of their official duties340—are exceedingly rare341 and 
have never been implemented in conformity with their literal text.342 Thus, the 
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modern sovereignty movement, in both its rhetoric and substantive content, likely 
minimizes (but does not eradicate) the problems of disunion traditionally associated 
with nullification.343 
Apart from its implications for national supremacy, vertical departmentalism may 
also be criticized on the more general grounds that it produces interjurisdictional legal 
disparities and is detrimental to the rule of law.344 Conflicting interpretations of 
constitutional rules can create a type of “interpretive anarchy,”345 thereby muddling the 
legal obligations of state actors and private citizens.346 Direct nullification may also 
engender lawlessness to the extent it invites civil disobedience.347 Furthermore, 
because it enables a broader range of participation in the interpretive enterprise, vertical 
departmentalism may amplify extremist viewpoints that would otherwise be muffled. 
This effect is exaggerated by the fact that nullification, as a tool of the dissenter, is 
disproportionately likely to be utilized by politicians outside the mainstream. 
Two observations serve to mitigate these concerns. First, although vertical 
departmentalism can reduce uniformity on certain issues, it may also solidify 
constitutional supremacy by compelling state officers to grapple directly with the 
constitutional text.348 Claims that departmentalism undermines the rule of law fail to 
recognize the “profound difference between the rule of law and submission to any 
particular institution’s understanding of what the law requires.”349 Opposition 
statutes—even when they appear to contradict settled judicial precedent—
universally assert fidelity to the Constitution itself.350 To the extent it forces 
governmental actors to engage with the text, departmentalism arguably reinforces 
the validity and authority of constitutional norms.351 
Second, the legal discrepancies produced by a scheme of interpretive pluralism 
will frequently be both temporary and constructive. Just as it serves to forestall the 
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implementation of dubious federal interpretations, vertical departmentalism may in 
practice temper extreme views and prompt competing governmental actors to strive 
for a degree of reflective equilibrium.352 “[T]he natural consequences of shared 
interpretive power . . . are often compromise, accommodation, or partial resolution—
not constitutional disaster.”353 In this light, state participation in the interpretive 
process is capable of contributing positively to the formation of stable, enduring 
constitutional settlements.354 Constitutional constructions or resolutions that emerge 
from popular consensus after a period of intensive debate may even achieve a binding 
quality absent in judicial decrees imposed by ipse dixit.355 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to sketch a comprehensive portrait of an important 
modern political movement: widespread state resistance to national policy. It has 
sought not only to establish a conceptual framework for parsing the movement’s 
functional and purposive qualities but also to identify a normative foundation for 
assessing its political legitimacy. Opposition measures, which are facially designed to 
serve a host of different functions, represent effective tools of dissent that have the 
potential to alter the course of constitutional adjudication and the content of federal 
policy. These statutes are united by their use of constitutional language, their political 
variability, and their territoriality. As a result, they constitute a unified and distinctive 
political phenomenon worthy of examination on its own terms. 
Although any normative assessment of this movement is intrinsically plagued by 
certain intractable empirical questions, opposition measures are accompanied by at 
least a modicum of political value to the extent they promote the aims of federalism 
within the constraints imposed by a national system. Modern exercises of state 
interpretive discretion occur primarily in the interstices of federal supremacy, 
thereby providing the benefits of departmentalism without posing any serious threat 
of national destabilization. The contemporary sovereignty movement thus represents 
a valuable element in the ongoing American effort to accommodate meaningful state 
autonomy with the demands of federal union. 
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